The introduction of the European Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) ended the quasi-monopoly of national exchanges in equity trading across Europe and many new trading platforms emerged. European trading venues are neither formally linked by technology nor does regulation enforce price-priority across platforms. This raises the question of market integration of fragmented markets. We find that quotes for UK blue-chip stocks are closely linked across trading venues and that a high fraction of trades is executed at best available prices. Our results suggest that competition forces competing but disconnected platforms to quote prices as if they were formally linked.
Introduction
Automation of exchanges and new regulation significantly altered the trading landscape during the last decade, facilitating new trading venues to enter the market for exchange business. One consequence of competition between trading venues is that liquidity, i.e. the ability to trade shares, is fragmented across different trading venues, creating search costs for investors. In the U.S., different trading venues are linked by the National Market System (NMS) so that investors can see the best available price. In Europe, there is no such link. Since it is in the investors interest to trade at best prices, it is an open question whether competition ensures an integrated market in the absence of a formal linkage. This paper addresses this question.
MiFID came into effect in all 27-member states of the European Union on November 1, 2007. It allows three types of platforms to compete for equity order flow: regulated markets, e.g. the London Stock Exchange and Euronext Paris, multilateral trading facilities (MTF), e.g. Chi-X and BATS, and investment firms acting as a systematic internalizer, e.g. Knight Capital Europe and Goldman Sachs International.
1 Today, the majority of trades is executed on regulated markets and MTFs with a steadily increasing MTF market share. MTFs are comparable to electronic communication networks (ECNs) in the U.S. Currently, Chi-X is the largest MTF in Europe accounting for roughly 27.0% of daily trading volume in UK blue-chip stocks and about 17.0% in continental European equity trading.
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In Europe, intermediaries (e.g. investment firms, brokers) that execute orders on behalf of their clients have to set out a best execution policy. This policy has to be reviewed at least once per year.
3 Best execution is multi-dimensional on factors such as price, trading costs, speed, size, probability of execution, or probability of settlement. To enhance pre-1 See http://mifiddatabase.esma.europa.eu/ for a complete list.
2 As of April 12, 2011, see http://www.ft.com/intl/trading-room/.
3 In some cases these rules are very simple. Deutsche Bank, for example, outlines that it executes clients' orders in German stocks on Xetra, the electronic order book of Deutsche Boerse, assuming that the largest platform in terms of trading volume also guarantees best prices.
trade transparency, MiFID requires regulated markets and MTFs to publish best bid and ask prices along with the number of shares quoted at these prices on a continuous basis. Post-trade requirements include the time of execution, the execution price, and the associated trading volume.
Competition between traditional exchanges and alternative trading venues resulted in the fragmentation of order flow and liquidity. Investors may not always receive the best available price as price-time priority is not enforced across markets. Less integrated markets may be detrimental to price discovery and may increase costs of trading such as access fees or search costs. Proponents of MiFID argue that intermarket competition put downward pressure on explicit transaction costs, for instance, exchange fees and brokerage commissions, and provided trading venues with incentives to innovate on their services (European Commission 2010) . Increasing use of technology may mitigate some of the potentially negative side effects of market fragmentation. For instance, algorithmic traders may link platforms by consolidating order flow.
Comparing European equity trading regulation under MiFID and its U.S. counterpart, Regulation NMS (RegNMS)
4 , reveals substantial differences. Most importantly, there is a lack of trade-through protection and consolidated trade and quote information in Europe. RegNMS requires trading venues to establish, maintain, and enforce procedures to prevent trade-throughs (Rule 611), i.e. orders that are executed at worse prices than the best available price across trading venues. For this purpose trading venues are electronically linked via the Intermarket Trading System (ITS) and private linkages. 5 In the U.S., comprehensive consolidated market information is available from the exchange industry.
The data compromise the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) for a stock, the corre-4 RegNMS is a further adaption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adapted RegNMS on June 9, 2005. The rules had different effective dates starting in August, 2005. 5 Rule 611, RegNMS (Order Protection Rule) only protects quotes that are immediately accessible for automatic execution. It does not protect manual quotes entered on 'slow' trading venues, i.e. a trading floor, and only takes outstanding limit order at the top of the book into account. Rule 610, RegNMS (Access Rule) guarantees fair access to quotations and limits fees that a trading venue may impose for execution against a protected quotation.
sponding volume, and the trading venue. European regulation does not establish a single data consolidator.
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There is an ongoing debate among practitioners and academics about the impact of differences in MiFID and RegNMS on market quality. MiFID allowed the market entry of new platforms but it does not impose a formal linkage between trading venues. O'Hara and Ye (2011) argue that "it is hard to see how a single virtual market can emerge" in Europe without consolidated trade and quote information and trade-through protections. Stoll (2001) , however, points out that a formal linkage may impede innovation and cause high infrastructure costs. This paper studies the question whether competition for order flow forces competing but disconnected platforms to quote prices that are closely integrated.
We study FTSE 100 constituents traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the three largest MTFs, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. Our analysis is based on two obser- The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 provides details to competing markets in the UK. Section 4 describes our data and Section 5 presents descriptive statistics. Section 6 examines the quote process. Section 7 analyzes trade executions across trading venues. Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
Related Work
There is an increasing body of literature that analyzes the effects of MiFID on market quality. Hengelbrock and Theissen (2009) use an event study approach to examine the market entry of Turquoise in 14 European countries. Results on liquidity are ambiguous, there is only some evidence that quoted spreads on traditional exchanges decline after the entry of Turquoise. On average, quoted and effective spreads tend to be higher on Turquoise. Riordan, Storkenmaier, and Wagener (2010) analyze competition between the LSE and MTFs in FTSE 100 constituents over an observation period in April/May 2009. Their data show that the LSE leads in liquidity provision and trade based price discovery whereas Chi-X leads in quote based price discovery. BATS and Turquoise contribute little to price formation. Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2011) There are a number of papers studying competition between traditional exchanges and ECNs in the U.S. Over the last decade, ECNs captured a significant fraction of trading volume, especially in Nasdaq-listed stocks. Findings support the view that competition between ECNs and Nasdaq market makers has significantly reduced quoted and effective spreads (Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz (1999) , Weston (2000) , and Fink, Fink, and Weston (2006) ). Trades on ECNs seem to be more informative and contribute to price discovery (Huang (2002) and Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick (2003) ). Goldstein, Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2008) show that ECNs are at the best bid/ask for a similar fraction of time compared to Nasdaq market makers. However, quote quality varies across ECNs and market maker quotes seem to be generally more stable, i.e. less volatile. Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2008) document locked and crossed markets for about 10.6% of the trading day for Nasdaq and 4.1% for NYSE-listed stocks over a sample period in 2003. They argue that locks and crosses arise naturally in fragmented markets, for example, due to simultaneously submitted quotes or stale limit orders.
Methodologically, our study is related to Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings (2004) One force that may integrate fragmented platforms are algorithmic or high-frequency traders. To date, algorithmic traders generate more than half of the trading volume in blue-chip stocks, submitting smaller orders at a higher frequency than human traders.
Trading speed became an important component of market quality (Garvey and Wu 2010) . Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) argue that high-frequency trading strategies, coordination in fragmented markets, and hidden liquidity promote new high-speed order submission strategies. There is evidence that algorithmic trading has a positive impact on liquidity (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld 2011) , order book depth (Hasbrouck and Saar 2011) , and quote based price discovery (Hendershott and Riordan 2009 ). Menkveld (2011) uses proprietary data to analyze multi-market trading of one high-frequency trader on Chi-X and Euronext (Amsterdam). It appears that the high-frequency trader acts as a market maker on both platforms enforcing market integration.
Details on the UK Stock Market
This section offers details on trading of FTSE 100 constituents 7 on the regulated market, the LSE, and MTFs. We limit our discussion to the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise as these four markets account for approximately 95% of non-OTC trading volume during our observation periods. Trading mechanism. While regulated markets and MTFs compete primarily on technology and trading costs, the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise provide the same basic market model. They all operate an electronic, fully integrated limit order book which 7 FTSE 100 constituents are the largest companies listed on the LSE representing a broad cross-section of industries.
8 http://www.chi-x.com/chi-x-press-releases/chi-x-europe-q2-2010-trading-stats-draft-v0-3.pdf. 9 http://www.batstrading.co.uk/resources/press releases/BATS Chi-X SPA FINAL.pdf.
combines both visible and hidden liquidity. To analyze the level of market integration, it is necessary to merge single order books of each trading venue into one consolidated order book per stock. Based on RICs and timestamps, we compute the European Best Bid (EBB), the highest bid across the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise, and the lowest ask price, the European Best Offer (EBO).
Thomson Reuters also delivers a consolidated FTSE 100 data feed including the best bid and ask published on all order book driven trading venues. However, the data do not reveal the trading venues that quote the best available prices. To properly assess trading venue differences, we therefore compute our own consolidated order book. 18 As a robustness check, we compare our consolidated order book including the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise with the Thomson Reuters consolidated European data feed using the xbo-RIC (see http://thomsonreuters.com/products services/financial/financial products/az/regulatory compliance mifid/ for a brief discussion of the data characteristics). First, we compute prevailing midpoint differences on a tick-by-tick basis between both data streams. Then, daily average values per stock are obtained. The data show a small average midpoint difference of 0.001 pence (0.001 pence) between both data streams for the 2009 (2010) LSE to 14.003 bps for Turquoise. All trading venues exhibit smaller quoted spreads at trades than during periods without trades. This is evidence that investors actively monitor multiple order books and trade when it is relatively inexpensive to do so. Effective spreads are not considerably different from quoted spreads at trades indicating that most trades are executed at the best bid or ask. Our results also suggest that a considerable number of trades is executed against hidden orders on Turquoise as the average effective spread is considerably smaller than the quoted spread at trades. 20 The observation period in 2009
shows that order book depth is significantly larger on the LSE and Chi-X than on BATS and Turquoise. However, we likely underestimate the depth at best prices due to iceberg orders and hidden liquidity.
In 2010, the average daily number of trades is 3,105 per stock on the LSE and 2,874
on Chi-X. However, the average trading volume is still considerably higher on the LSE.
The average LSE trade size is roughly 3,500 GBP larger than on Chi-X. This result is consistent with Goldstein, Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2008) 
Quote Quality
In this section we focus on quote quality. Quotes are determined by traders who submit limit orders. It is possible that traders systematically ignore competing quotes on other 20 We find that on average about 3.0% (11.0%) of all trades on Turquoise are executed inside the individual order book's spread over the 2009 (2010) observation period.
platforms, so that arbitrage opportunities arise. Section 6.1 describes how long each market is at the inside spread in the sense that it quotes the highest bid (EBB) and the lowest ask across trading venues (EBO). Section 6.2 investigates the prevalence of locked (EBB=EBO) and crossed markets (EBB>EBO). Section 6.3 provides details on determinants of non-positive spread initiations and terminations per platform.
Quote Competition
Transaction costs compromise of explicit and implicit trading costs. Explicit costs include, for instance, transaction fees and taxes, implicit costs are associated with costs for immediacy, market risk, and market impact. Assuming equal explicit costs and sufficient market depth across trading venues, investors can realize best execution selling (buying) in the market with the highest bid (lowest ask). As a consequence, the attractiveness of a trading venue to liquidity takers may be characterized by the platform's participation rate in the inside spread. We provide four measures of quote competitiveness (Goldstein, Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness 2008) : (1): presence at the EBBO (inside bid and/or ask) (2): presence at the EBB and EBO (3): alone at the EBBO (inside bid and/or ask) (4): alone at the EBB and EBO. Table 2 (Table 2 , Panel C). A quote is considered to have time priority either if it is at the best bid or ask alone or if it is at the best bid or ask and additionally has been submitted earlier than quotes at the same price (Goldstein, Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness 2008) . We average time priority of the bid and ask side of the order book per day and per stock. Time priority varies between 29.9% for Chi-X, 9.7% for BATS, and 15.0% for Turquoise over the observation period in 2009. LSE quotes have time priority in 44.5% in 2009 and in 38.8% in 2010. However, Chi-X increases time priority of its quotes by 7.8% between the two observation periods. In comparison to the LSE and Chi-X, time priority of BATS and Turquoise is smaller indicating more frequent quote changes. Flickering quotes may reduce transparency, discourage liquidity provision, and complicate best execution.
Locked and Crossed Markets
We follow Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings (2004) and identify locks and crosses in the consolidated order book. A stock is considered locked if the best bid equals the best ask on another trading venue (EBB=EBO, inside spread is zero) and it is crossed if the highest bid across trading venues is greater than the lowest ask across trading venues (EBB>EBO, inside spread is negative). Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings (2004) argue that "locked and crossed quotes locked and crossed quotes represent foregone trading opportunities" and are not in the investor's best interest, assuming that investors want to trade instead of quoting. Under RegNMS, the SEC requires trading venues to establish, maintain, and enforce rules which prevent traders to lock or cross protected quotations (Rule 610), assuming that non-positive spreads are inconsistent with fair and orderly markets. MiFID does not address this concern. Table 3 Table 3 here -Crossed quotes provide potential arbitrage opportunities and thus, are particularly interesting. Assuming that one trading venue quotes a higher bid than the lowest ask across the other platforms (EBB>EBO), an arbitrageur may buy shares and immediately sell them to realize a profit. To explore arbitrage activity, we look at the duration of crosses along with trading activity when a stock is crossed. We establish seven duration of cross categories: 1 to 9 milliseconds, 10 to 19 milliseconds, 20 to 49 milliseconds, 50 to 99 milliseconds, 100 to 999 milliseconds, 1,000 to 4,999 milliseconds, and equal or larger 5 seconds. Table 4 reports the number of crosses, the percentage of crosses with at least one trade, the tick size, and the value of a cross per category on a daily stock basis. Overall, differences in the number of crosses do not differ significantly between both observation periods. However, we find a strong tendency towards a shorter average duration of crosses. For example, the average number of daily crosses that lasts more than 5 seconds decreases from roughly 10 over the 2009 observation period to less than 1 in 2010. The average tick size and the value of a cross reveals that most crosses are only initiated by a difference of one tick between the EBB and the EBO. We also see a significant increase in trading activity for all duration categories. There is even at least one trade for crosses that last less than 10 milliseconds in almost 80.0% of time.
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Insert Table 4 here -21 Table 1 shows an significant increase in daily number of trades between the observation period in 2009 and 2010. As a consequence, trades during crosses become more likely by construction.
However, we argue that arbitrageurs actively take advantage of price differences. Our data allow us to estimate revenues from apparent arbitrage opportunities. We 
Determinants of Locked and Crossed Markets
This section examines initiations and terminations of locks and crosses for each trading venue separately. While we analyze the aggregated market in previous sections, we now seek to identify differences in initiations and terminations of locks and crosses between platforms. We further test several factors that potentially affect investors decisions to submit locking or crossing quotes in a multivariate regression framework. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on active, passive, and simultaneous locks and crosses for the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise per day and per stock. According to Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2008) , active initiations of locks (crosses) are characterized by an outstanding quote which is actively locked (crossed) and which stands in the order book for a minimum duration before being locked (crossed), here 250 milliseconds 22 . Active terminations of locks and crosses are defined accordingly. A simultaneous 22 We also perform our analysis with a time limit of 1 second and find the expected significant increase lock (cross) happens if an investor submits a limit order that locks (crosses) a quote which was posted less than 250 milliseconds before. Chi-X and the LSE still submit the highest fraction of active locks and crosses and BATS (1)
where the dependent variable equals one for bid-initiated (ask-initiated) non-positive inside spreads with j ∈ {Lock, Cross} and is zero otherwise. π is the modeled response probability, InsideSpreadLag the inside quoted spread before a lock or cross is initiated, and TimeLSE, TimeChiX, TimeBATS and TimeTQ represent the outstanding quote time on each of the four trading venues in seconds. The variables vol1 and rv1 are control variables representing lagged one minute trading volume in British Pounds/10 6 and lagged one minute realized volatility in basis points preceding a price change. 24 We further include firm dummy variables and intraday dummy variables for each half-hour of the trading day.
Times of high trading activity may be an indication that traders disagree on public information or have differential private information. A resulting demand for speedy executions can increase the probability of locks and crosses. According to Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2008) , we expect locks and crosses to become more likely when inside spreads are narrow. In line with our expectations, we obtain significantly negative coefficients on InsideSpreadLag for all regression models (Table 6 ).
Insert Table 6 here - 23 We exclude quote updates that do not change the EBB (EBO) from the regressions. 24 Given the average duration of positive inside spreads (about 48 sec over the 2009 observation period and 73 sec in 2010, see Table 3 ), lagged one minute variables seem to be a reasonable choice. However, we rerun all regressions with lagged three minute control variables. The results do not change and are therefore not reported.
In their study of locks and crosses in Nasdaq and NYSE-listed stocks, Shkilko, Van Ness, MiFID's main objective is to create greater competition across Europe and to contribute to more integrated financial markets. Our evidence on quote competition suggests that inside quotes change frequently. We find that cross and lock initiations and ter- 
Trade-Throughs
In the fragmented UK trading environment, investors sometimes execute worse than the best available price, e.g. the best available price is traded-through. Trade-throughs represent a violation of price priority and "are indicative of economically inefficient trades because investors seemingly should receive better prices" (Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings 2004) . Section 7.1 examines the question whether investors do execute at the best available price and Section 7.2 analyzes determinants of trade-throughs in a multivariate regression framework. Table 7 reports trade-through rates as percentages of the daily number of trades (Panel A) and as percentage of daily trading volume (Panel B) per stock over both observation periods. 25 We further differentiate between five trade sizes categories measured by shares traded: 0-499 shares, 500-1,999 shares, 2,000-4,999 shares, 5,000-9,999 shares, and trades with 10,000 shares or more. Chi-X, and BATS. An increasing trade-through rate in trade-sizes provide some evidence that investors trade off best prices and available depth. Large orders may execute against multiple limit orders at different levels in the order book. Findings suggest that investors rather optimize the average volume-weighted trade price than executing simply at the best price. We also see that in volume terms trade-throughs are much more prevalent (Table 7 , Panel B).
Trade-Through Statistics
Insert Table 7 here - Figure 3 depicts the fraction of trades for different order execution levels. We see 25 Orders may execute against hidden orders in the order book that are not visible to any investor. To allow a clean analysis of trade-through determinants, we do not include those types of trades.
26 We base our classification on SEC trade size categories (see RegNMS, Rule 600). 27 In their May 2010 report, Equiduct Trading provides an average trade-through rate of 8.6% for FTSE 100 constituents traded on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise that is similar to the fraction we find in our data, see http://www.equiduct.com/.
that a high fraction of trade-throughs is executed one or two ticks away from the EBBO during both observation periods. Our data allow us to estimate potential savings of avoiding trade-throughs. It appears that there is not always sufficient depth available at the EBBO to execute the entire order strictly at the best price. 
Determinants of Trade-Throughs
To better understand the factors that lead to a trade-through, we estimate bivariate logistical regressions on trade-throughs for each of the two observation periods. The dependent variable takes the value one for a trade-through and is zero otherwise. The general model is defined as follows:
where π is the modeled response probability, InsideSpread the inside spread in basis points at trade time, and AvgDepth1 is the average quoted volume of the consolidated order book. ShareVolume is the number of shares traded divided by 1,000. The variables vol1 and rv1 are control variables and defined as in Equation (1). 29 We further include firm dummy variables and intraday dummy variables for each half-hour during the trading day. Table 8 provides the regression estimates for all trading venues combined and each trading venue separately over both observation periods.
Insert Table 8 are significantly negative indicating that trade-throughs become less likely with an increasing average depth at best prices in the consolidated order book. Our results are confirmed when we replace AvgDepth1 with average depth up to three ticks behind best prices. This may be evidence that depth as a decision factor becomes less important for investors along with a high level of consolidated depth. Investors are rather concerned to trade at the best available price across trading venues. Our findings are mirrored in the results on ShareVolume, which has a positive coefficient in all regressions and confirms our descriptive statistics ( Table 7) . The probability of a trade-through increases in trade size. Increasing lagged trading volume (vol1 ) and lagged volatility (rv1 ) 83.5% decline in non-positive spreads. In addition, we estimate that potential arbitrage revenues before transaction costs fall by 38,7% between both observation periods per day and per stock. It appears that competition for order flow forces disconnected trading venues to quote closely aligned prices.
Best execution under MiFID is multi-dimensional on factors such as price, trading costs, speed, size, probability of execution, or other factors. This is in contrast to U.S. regulation which enforces price priority across trading venues. We examine trade-throughs, e.g. trades that are executed worse than the best available price across platforms. Our data shows that the average trade-through rate decreases from 7.7% over our first observation period to 6.0% in April/May 2010. We interpret this result as evidence for an increasing use of smart order routing systems. Regressions show that trade-throughs become more likely in times of narrow inside spreads suggesting that investors trade off liquidity and search costs during fast-moving market periods.
Regulatory authorities, practitioners, and academics are concerned that MiFID results in a fragmented European trading landscape, but leaves it to the market to solve integration. Our research provides some evidence that competition forces may be able to integrate disconnected platforms and that infrastructure costs of a formal linkage may be avoided.
Computational Details
In this section we provide details on the computation of our liquidity measures. The most common measure is the quoted spread. The wider the quoted spread, the less liquid is an instrument. However, this variable only captures liquidity for relatively small order sizes. Quoted spreads are calculated as a proxy of trading costs for each trading venue on an individual order book level. Let a i,t be the ask price for an instrument i at time t and b i,t the respective bid price. m i,t denotes the mid quote, then the relative quoted half spread (qspread i,t ) in basis points is calculated as follows:
This measure is based on a quote-to-quote process that is characterized by every price or volume update and each trade during the trading day. Then, quoted spreads are aggregated per day and per stock for each trading venue. To avoid some of the noise of tickby-tick data, all liquidity measures are winsorized at the 1.0% level and the 99.0% level.
Another liquidity measure, quoted spread at trades (qspread trade i,t ), captures liquidity represented through the best bid and ask at the time of execution. The effective spread is the spread that is actually paid when an incoming market order trades against a limit order. We use the standard Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to estimate trade direction as proposed by Bessembinder (2003) . Using the variables from above and let p i,t be the execution price, then the effective half spread (espread i,t ) is defined as:
where D i,t denotes the trade direction with −1 for market sell and +1 for market buy orders. Effective spreads also capture institutional features of trading venues like hidden liquidity or market depth. For example, iceberg-orders that only display a fraction of total trading volume and fully hidden limit orders are available on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. Effective spreads are usually equal to or larger than the second liquidity measure, quoted spreads at trades. However, they might be smaller if trading venues feature hidden liquidity and there is a reasonable number of trades executed inside the spread.
Finally, depth data is used to the compute the quoted volume at different order book levels in individual order books of each trading venue. Let B i,t be the corresponding volume at the bid and A i,t at the ask, then the quoted half depth (depth x,i,t ) in British Pounds is computed as follows:
where X = {1, 3} characterizes the order book level. depth 1,i,t is the average half quoted volume at the best bid and ask and depth 3,i,t incorporates the quoted volume up to three ticks behind best prices. The table presents means and standard deviations in parentheses for different market regimes per day and per stock for both observation periods. A positive inside spread characterizes a 'normal' market regime with a positive inside spread (EBB<EBO). A stock is locked if the best posted bid across all trading venues equals the best ask (EBB=EBO). If markets are crossed, a trading venue's inside bid is greater than another markets ask (EBB>EBO). Mean differences between the two observation periods are tested for statistical significance using Thompson (2011) Table 4 Detailed Analysis of Crossed Market Quotes
The table presents statistics for crossed market regimes per day and per stock over both observation periods. A stock is crossed, if a trading venue's inside bid is greater than another markets ask (EBB>EBO). The average number of crosses, the percentage of crosses with one or more trades reported during the cross, the average tick size, the average difference of the best bid and ask in pence, and potential arbitrage revenues in GBP are presented for different duration of crosses per day and per stock. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below the daily means. Mean differences between the two observation periods are tested for statistical significance using Thompson (2011) Table 6 Logistic Regressions: Determinants of Lock and Cross Initiations
We run bivariate logistical regressions on locks and crosses for both observation periods separately. The dependent variable equals one for bid-initiated (ask-initiated) non-positive inside spread initiations and is zero otherwise. The last inside spread in basis points is InsideSpreadLag and TimeLSE, TimeChiX, TimeBATS, and TimeTQ represent the outstanding quote time in seconds on each of the four trading venues before a quote change. vol1
and rv1 are control variables representing the lagged trading volume in British Pounds/10 6 and the realized volatility in basis points over the one minute interval proceeding the quote change. Chi-Square statistics are reported in parentheses below the regression estimates. 'a' denotes significance at the 1% level and 'b' at the 5% level. We do not report firm dummy variables and intraday dummy variables for each half hour. 
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